E690 | Sacha Michaud, Glovo: Scaling a Hyper-Competitive Marketplace (and knowing when to exit)

Sacha Michaud built Glovo into one of Europe's largest delivery marketplaces, then sold it to Delivery Hero for €2.3 billion. But the most revealing moment in his journey wasn't the exit itself, it was when his VCs actively discouraged him from taking it. This tension between founder and investor interests during exit discussions reveals a structural misalignment that every entrepreneur should understand before they cash their first VC check.

The conventional wisdom holds that VCs and founders want the same thing: maximum returns. Michaud learned this isn't always true. "VCs do not always want an acquisition to happen because oftentimes, it's not in the best interest of a VC. They would rather go for the moonshot of an IPO or whatever than they would sell out in their terms because that would give them a lower outcome," he explains. While founders often view a successful acquisition as life-changing wealth, VCs view it as just one data point in a portfolio that needs outsized winners to compensate for inevitable losses. This creates a fundamental misalignment when exit opportunities arise.

The stakes matter because this dynamic shapes every major strategic decision. Michaud discovered that "you're used to being able to rely on your VCs a lot. You're used to sparring with them on a lot of things. But on this one point, a VC will very likely have different interest than you as a founder." The implication is stark: when the moment arrives to potentially cash out years of work, the advisors you've relied on may actively push against your interests. Smart founders need to understand this tension exists and plan accordingly, whether through board composition, liquidation preferences, or simply mental preparation for the eventual conflict.

Michaud's approach to product development offers a more immediately actionable lesson for current operators. While most startups obsess over feature completeness, Glovo succeeded by ruthlessly focusing on just one or two consumer needs. "Consumers are generally interested in one specific thing or two things. Right? And just got to get those right. And then the other stuff is nice to have," Michaud argues. This wasn't theoretical for Glovo, they built their entire competitive strategy around speed and selection while deliberately deprioritizing features that felt important internally but didn't move consumer behavior.

This focus required killing projects that the team loved but data didn't support. "Being radical. I mean, being very mature about you know, we all have ideas and things we love and but if the data's not coming back and it's really at the end, you just have to pull the plug on it and focus on less things," Michaud reflects. The discipline to cut beloved features based on user indifference, not internal enthusiasm, separated Glovo from competitors who tried to build everything at once. Most founders struggle with this because it requires admitting that good ideas executed well can still be strategically wrong.

Glovo's geographic strategy demonstrates how strategic focus applies to market expansion. Rather than defending every market they entered, Michaud made the counterintuitive decision to exit Latin America entirely despite early success. The team "had an opportunity to exit the market successfully" with a competitor and used that capital to "double down in Eastern Europe." This wasn't retreat, it was recognition that being good everywhere is less valuable than being dominant somewhere. The Latin America exit gave Glovo the resources to build an unassailable position in Eastern Europe, ultimately making the company more valuable and more defensible.

The lesson extends beyond delivery marketplaces. In hyper-competitive markets, the instinct to fight on every front usually leads to mediocrity across all fronts. Michaud's willingness to cede territory strategically, then reinvest those resources in winnable markets, created the concentrated market power that made Glovo an attractive acquisition target. Geographic focus became a competitive moat.

For founders navigating similar decisions today, Michaud's experience suggests three concrete actions. First, explicitly discuss exit preferences with your investors before you need their support for an actual deal. The time to discover misaligned incentives isn't during acquisition discussions. Second, regularly audit your product roadmap for features that feel important but don't drive user behavior, then kill them ruthlessly. Third, consider strategic retreats from markets where you're fighting for second place, especially if those resources could make you dominant elsewhere.

The broader implication is that successful scaling requires saying no more often than saying yes. Whether it's features, markets, or even exit opportunities, the companies that win pick their battles carefully. Michaud built Glovo by choosing focus over optionality at every critical juncture. That discipline, more than any single strategic insight, made the eventual €2.3 billion exit possible.