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19 results for “investment mistakes”
“VC admits biggest investing mistake: it's not what you think”
...any individual investment. And I I do believe it's just hard to know in advance. You do your best, but it's hard to know what are gonna be the winners and what are gonna be the losers.
1:20 / 1:56
personal lesson1:20 – 1:56
...investments are necessarily mistakes. So when you invest, you are trying to predict what's going to happen in the future or estimate the probabilities of what will happen in the future. Sometimes you take a take on uncertainty when you invest and the
7:29 / 8:31
from transcript7:29 – 8:31
...an investment. If it is too many, I don't invest, but if there are none, I also don't invest. There needs to be something a little bit out of the ordinary. It's like, I believe that for this to actually translate into something big. So I I always hav
44:53 / 46:03
from transcript44:53 – 46:03
...mistakes all the time. The biggest investment mistake I've made in this firm, this fund, which because I've made a lot. My wife can tell you about is that I calculated the potential of m and a into my valuation model and overly weighted it for a part
1:07:19 / 1:08:33
from transcript1:07:19 – 1:08:33
...investment advice. Because I think people get very caught up in the moment, by the way, on things being too good or things being too bad. And the key is just to sort of maintain this, equilibrium. This too shall pass. If I gave you a $100,000, what w
42:37 / 44:28
from transcript42:37 – 44:28
...say not all of our bad investments are necessarily mistakes.
6:42 / 7:48
from transcript6:42 – 7:48
Because I think you may find that it's very hard to find the winners, and you may not find the winners often enough to pay for the losers or the mediocre. You have to be very, very realistic about what competitive advantage do you have in terms of ac
33:33 / 34:51
from transcript33:33 – 34:51
of the world, so I'll invest in emerging managers. Because I think you may find that it's very hard to find the winners, and you may not find the winners often enough to pay for the losers or the mediocre. You have to be very, very realistic about wh
33:00 / 34:10
from transcript33:00 – 34:10
...plenty of years to perform or not perform before you pass judgment. So what are some dumb reasons to sell? While most investors aren't waiting long enough before evaluating their funds, they're also guilty of another cardinal sin of investing that's
5:14 / 6:23
from transcript5:14 – 6:23
...mistakes you can make. One is you can hire a manager you wished you hadn't or make an investment you wished you hadn't or not make an investment you wished you had. And I would say we are comfortable with the latter and really uncomfortable with the
43:31 / 44:36
from transcript43:31 – 44:36
...investment in that sector still can be good and become the headquarters in the platform later. And so it gives that great opportunity, I think, to increase your margin of safety, increase an opportunity for success. So all that stuff together creates
14:51 / 16:05
from transcript14:51 – 16:05
...investment. And I I do believe it's just hard to know in advance. You do your best, but it's hard to know what are gonna be the winners and what are gonna be the losers. And, you know, presumably, everyone should recognize this because there are, as
1:24 / 2:30
from transcript1:24 – 2:30
...an investment committee on board with allowing you to do something that was very different from what other people were doing. How does one modulate their behavioral biases in that context? Because we always seem to learn from our mistakes more than o
33:51 / 34:53
from transcript33:51 – 34:53
...investments in history has a meaningful portion of its track record looking wrong on a calendar year basis. The lesson is straightforward, but experiencing this as an investor is uncomfortable. Even if you identify a long term winner, you should expe
5:15 / 6:25
from transcript5:15 – 6:25
...investment, just be aware that the shorter your holding period, the more that randomness and luck will influence your returns, making false confidence and incorrect conclusions easy to build. When examining performance over just a handful of recent y
4:35 / 5:39
from transcript4:35 – 5:39
And our relative returns will be even if the absolute returns are not quite as high, the relative returns will be better. And I feel like we've taken a lot of our lumps. Like, we talked about the venture marks earlier. I feel like we've written down
39:33 / 40:46
from transcript39:33 – 40:46
So I make it harder for them to plan, you know, because they're not sure when they put the money if it's gonna be good for one year or two years or nine months. So I you know, so it makes their sizing decision more difficult. So I you know, I get it.
27:40 / 28:45
from transcript27:40 – 28:45
...mistakes in in in new investments, I also make mistakes in, in full on. So I'll give you an example. A company that was in the prop tech space and seemed to be on fire. You know, it went from 2,000,000 run rate to 30,000,000 the a year after invested
21:00 / 22:09
from transcript21:00 – 22:09
...mistakes that family officers make is that they think they can play venture and play Dire Acts with, you know, Peter who does Vancher for two days. If you have 50,000,000 I mean, let's just, like, back into it. Like, let's use a 100 for round numbers
50:33 / 52:12
from transcript50:33 – 52:12
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